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Preface 
 
There is little evidence that health sector reform of the last decade in Eastern Europe 
led to substantial improvements in the health care sector. On the contrary, the adopted 
Western ideals of privatisation, decentralisation and competition policies coupled with 
the ineffectiveness of existing health sector arrangements resulted (in different 
countries to different extent) in escalating health sector expenditures, overuse of 
services and growing health inequalities. It is, however, not surprising that reformist 
policies failed to bring substantial improvements in the health care sector.  
 
On the one hand, it is difficult to acknowledge the actual effectiveness of those 
policies even in Western countries initiating them. It is, therefore, unclear whether the 
process of health sector reform in Eastern Europe was predominantly driven by 
objectives of health sector improvements or by any other factors. For example, 
political values of freedom and individualism associated with free market competition 
and democratisation or, benefits from the implementation of particular policies such 
as legitimisation of the political power. It is also unclear whether architects of health 
sector reform in Eastern Europe had a long-term view on reform and whether the 
outcomes of health sector reform were intended. 
 
On the other hand, even when the most technically-effective and cost-contained 
Western policies were adopted, they could not work successfully in Eastern Europe if 
no credence was given to the context in which they were implemented. When policy-
makers look across national borders for “best” policies, they are inclined to “pay more 
attention to what appears to work, not academic reasons for what is and is not 
transferable and why” (Marmor, 2001, p.15). As such, policy-makers in Eastern 
Europe could not pay attention to a lack of institutional capacities to implement, 
manage and sustain health sector reform. Also, little attention could be paid to 
existing institutions which substantively constrained and counteracted reforms. 
  
Despite the importance of the process and context of health policy reform, studies of 
such reform have erroneously been focused primarily on the technical features of 
policy content (Walt and Gilson, 1994). It was disregarded that a study of the process 
and context of health policy reform could provide insights into factors that influence 
the choice of particular policies by decision makers, the ultimate success of the 
implementation, and why the desired results failed to emerge or even why the 
emerged results were coveted. More specifically, such a study can shed light on the 
factors that drive a transfer of health policies across national borders and affect 
transferability and applicability of these policies under specific institutional 
constraints of a given country. There is, therefore, a glaring need to study factors such 
as political power and interests of different agencies, pressure groups and other policy 
actors (at the sub-national, national and supranational levels), political, legal and 
social institutions that structure their interaction as well as the overall legitimacy of 
the policy-making system in terms of its capacity to reach good choices.  
 
In applied health policy literature, however, little attention is paid to political 
challenges of health sector reform agenda and implementation. It is widely 
disregarded that behind any new policy there are individual and composite actors with 
conflicting interests and that the process of policy implementation represents a 
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political struggle between those actors over symbolic and material resources. For 
example, Reich (1997) points out that the World Development Report of 1993 
contains seven chapters on the content but only five paragraphs on the process of 
health sector reform. Similarly, the World Health Report of 2000 disregards how 
politics shapes problems and affects reforms; the World Health Organisation (WHO) 
makes its recommendations “as if health sector reform occurs in a political vacuum” 
(Hsiao, Roberts, Bergman, Reich, 2001, p.70). As a result, many well-designed 
policies of the World Bank and the WHO proved to be ineffective or, have never been 
implemented at all. In agreement, Orosz and Burns (2000, p. 39) in their seminal 
OECD paper on health sector reform in Hungary acknowledge the importance of the 
politics of health sector reform: 
 
...the recent history of healthcare in Hungary is wrought with conflicts between 
different agencies and care-giver interest groups. A major challenge will be to 
introduce reforms in a way that reduces these… [conflicts] and increases co-operation 
between agencies. 
 
Notwithstanding the importance of conflicting interests in health policy 
implementation, “[t]he tendency to overlook implementation issues,” argues Marmor 
(1994, p. 217), “is not surprising, given how difficult, and unglamorous, it is to figure 
out the nuts and bolts of real programs—and how much more exciting for politician 
and policy analysts to bandy about big ideas”. Figueras, Saltman and Mossialos 
(1997) came to similar conclusions regarding the salience of the politics in health 
sector reform and a lack of research. Consequently, they argue that “a major priority 
[for health sector reform] research is the study of reform process, including aspects 
such as the effects of political and socio-economic environment or the distribution of 
power between key stakeholders in the health system” (ibid., p.17).  
 
Having examined the methodology currently employed for health policy reform 
studies, Figueras, Saltman and Mossialos (ibid.) put forward an argument for a more 
multidisciplinary, analytical and comparative approach to health sector reform studies. 
Apparently, advantages of such an approach are as follows. One, comparative 
analytical studies of health policy reforms can lead to the explanation of what factors 
affect agenda and implementation of health sector reforms with the effect that health 
systems in different countries have different equity, effectiveness, efficiency and 
responsiveness to users’ needs as well as users have different varieties of choices. 
Two, multidisciplinary studies can shed light on different dimensions of health sector 
reform, giving us a more complete view of the logic and impact of health policy 
reform. More specifically, multidisciplinary study can help us to overcome “ironies” 
created by the former divergence of social and economic sciences (Lindenberg, 1990). 
One of these ironies is that those who studied decision-making situations did not pay 
attention to decision-making and those who studied decision-making did not pay 
attention to decision-making situations and to the fact that different actors can define 
the same situation in different ways (Lindenberg, 1993, p. 11). 
 
In policy research, as it was shown above in the case of the WB and WHO 
documents, this irony resulted in that policy analysts felt that their job is done when a 
problem was identified and an appropriate policy instruments to tackle this problem 
were proposed. Policy outcome was considered to be the result of an action of the 
principal policy actor and his crafty manipulation of other actors involved in the 
policy process. The fallacy of this perspective of thinking about policy is best 
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demonstrated by the failure of the Clinton health care reform in the United States in 
1993. More than 700 pages of well-design legislature were defeated in Congress and 
fueled a massive political upheaval as the administration did not take into 
considerations interests of employers and the health care sector as well as their ability 
to influence public debate and Congressional voting (Skocpol, 1995, Giamo and 
Manow, 1999). As such, a new perspective about policy needs to be formulated and 
applied to the study of health sector reform. 
 
Contemporary political science has presented a perspective that can bridge the study 
between the decision-making and human decision-making situation. Borrowed from 
microeconomics, political science and sociology game-theoretic perspective can 
substantially refine our thinking about policy and therefore should be employed in 
policy analysis (Scharpf, 1997). The main focus of a game-theoretic explanation is on 
the interaction between purposeful actors. It is more likely that policy outcomes 
resulted not from an action of a principal policy actor but rather from a strategic 
interaction among purposeful policy actors who have different action orientations and 
capabilities to influence policy outcomes and who make their choices separately but 
with the awareness of the interdependence between their and the other actors’ choices.  
 
In my current research project at the Center for Policy Studies, I address the challenge 
of explaining the factors affecting feasibility of health sector reform in Eastern Europe 
through the study of process and context of health sector reform. In doing so, I focus 
on the strategic interaction between actors in health policy arena and institutionalised 
modes of the interaction and use a game-theoretic perspective to frame it. I also draw 
on the advantages of the comparative analytical approach as outlined above. 
Therefore, the project is designed as a comparative analytical interaction-oriented case 
study of the politics of health sector reform in selected Eastern European countries. In 
the first phase of the project, I introduce the topic of the politics of health sector 
reform in Eastern Europe, single out promising political science approaches to 
research into this topic and propose a framework for further research.   In the second 
phase of the project, I will apply this framework to the comparative analysis of the 
politics of health sector reform in Hungary and the Czech Republic. In doing so, my 
attempt is to draw policy lessons for health sector reform design and implementation 
in Eastern Europe. 
 
Abstract 
The threefold purpose of this paper is to introduce the topic of the politics of health 
sector reform in Eastern Europe, to critically examine various approaches, theories 
and concepts of political science applicable to research into this topic and, using this 
critique, to suggest some promising lines of inquiry into this topic. The paper is 
organised as follows. It starts with the introduction of the topic. Then the significance 
as well as theoretical and methodological challenges for research into this topic are 
considered. It proceeds further by proposing and discussing an explanatory paradigm 
consisting of methodological individualism, game theory, rational choice theory and 
new institutionalism. On this ground, the proposition is made that the framework of 
actor-centered institutionalism provides a promising line of inquiry into the politics of 
health sector reform in Eastern Europe. It will not only allow to explain past policy 
choices but also to produce systematic knowledge useful for developing feasible 
policy recommendations and for designing institutions that maximise public good.  
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1. Introduction 
 
There has been an intriguing controversy in the development of health care systems 
throughout Europe during the post-war period. In 1948, Britain was the first Western 
European country to implement a national health service (NHS). This was a health 
care system based on need and not ability to pay; it was free to the whole population 
at the point of use. The NHS was based on the universal collective provision of free-
for-service at the point of use health care financed via general taxation. Following 
Britain, in the late 1950s and the 1960s, Sweden and later other Scandinavian 
countries launched their de jure and/or de facto national health services1. During the 
1970s and the mid-1980s, all Southern European countries followed this way. In sharp 
contrast, the years of political and economic transformation in Eastern European 
countries2 have had a negative impact on national health services in these countries. 
Health care reforms3 instead of re-forming existing national health services fully or 
partially, dismantled them in favour of fee-for-service insurance-based health care 
systems. It is unclear why the reforms happened in this way. There is no evidence that 
the former centrally run and financed through general taxation health care systems are 
not viable under the conditions of democracy and market economy and are 
comparatively less efficient4. There is, therefore, a challenge to explain why Eastern 
European policy-makers instead of enhancing existing institutions deviated from a 
path-dependent way and came up with ineffective solutions for health sector reform. 
 
                                                 
1
 Here and later, I refer to the universal, i.e. covering the whole population, collective, i.e. financed via 
general taxation or social insurance, health care system as national health service. In doing so, I 
deliberately downplay the question of centralisation what allows me to put in one group such 
centralised national health service as the NHS and such locally run national health services as the 
Swedish or Italian ones.  
2
 I use terms “Eastern European countries” and “Eastern Europe” to refer to countries of the former 
Eastern Block which are geographically situated in Central and Eastern Europe. 
3
 In this paper, I use term “reform” to refer to the process of changing national health sector 
arrangements in Eastern Europe, which is commonly known as “health sector reform”. I recognise that 
this way of describing change in national health sector arrangements arises from the political jargon. 
Although I stick to the common discourse, in my references to health care reform in Eastern Europe, I 
do not attach to “reform” any other meanings except of “change”. 
4
 For example, Norway, with effect from January 2002 onwards, is strengthening its centralised health 
care system by taking over the responsibilities of all Norwegian hospitals from local authorities to the 
central Government. Furthermore, the United Kingdom is not switching the source of funding of the 
NHS to social insurance but rather, with the perspective to 2020, considering allocation to the NHS of 
more funds raised through general taxation (Wanless, 2002).  
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During the pre-war period, health care provision in Eastern European countries were 
mainly modelled according to the so-called Bismarkian model or social insurance 
model. At the same time, this paradigm developed differently in various countries. For 
example, the Czech health care system was amongst the best in Europe and provided 
almost all population with health insurance. In contrast, the Polish health care system 
was highly fragmented and underdeveloped; more than two thirds of the Polish 
population were not insured (Marrée and Groenewegen, 1997). After the war, Eastern 
European countries adopted, with many variations, the Soviet-style Semashko model 
of health care provision. Under this model, provision of health care, as in the case of 
the above-mentioned NHS (also commonly referred as the Beveridge model), was 
both universal and collective5. It proved to be effective as well efficient. During the 
1950s, health improvements in Eastern European countries outpaced those in most 
Western countries and by the mid-1960s life expectancy in Eastern European 
countries was only one or two years less than in Western countries (Barr, 1996, p.24). 
In the 1970s, however, declining effectiveness, efficiency and equity of national 
health services in Eastern European countries demonstrated a need for improvements 
in health care provision. Many Eastern European countries came up with proposals for 
health care reform in the 1980s; continuing into the 1990s, when transition to market 
economy and democracy began, none of the substantial changes in health care 
provision had yet been implemented.    
 
In the beginning of transition, health sectors of different Eastern European countries 
faced similar challenges. For example, the health sectors were underfinanced, 
overstaffed, and misbalanced in favour of inpatient curative services. To address these 
challenges, Eastern European countries adopted more or less similar strategies; 
mainly, a switch of the major source of funding from general taxation to the 
compulsory contributory insurance, decentralisation, and introduction of the private 
sector while also promoting competition, and development of the private institute of 
the general practitioner. For example, in 1990 the deputy state secretary at the 
Hungarian Ministry of Social Welfare clearly stated priorities for reform: “We want to 
change the structure of the [health] system to create new facilities, new ownership 
circumstances, and involve more and more market elements” (cited in: Williams, 
                                                 
5
 The difference between the Beveridge model and the Semashko model is that the former separates 
financing and providing of services while the latter simultaneously controls them. 
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1993, p.1093). The pace of reform differed among the countries. Hungary, for 
instance, was the first Eastern European country that came up with clear proposals for 
radical health care reform but implemented them slowly and to a less radical degree. 
Although the Czech Republic formulated its strategies for health care reform later and 
in less radical terms, it appeared to be the first country in the region that completed 
radical transition to the social insurance based system of health care provision. In 
Poland, despite the early fragmented privatisation of the medical heath industry and 
the establishment of the private sector, the state deliberately slowed the process of 
health care reform. The Polish government promised to retain the publicly funded 
health care system in order to relieve hardship caused by economic liberalisation, also 
known as “shock therapy”, but it was only in 1999 when the final stage of reform was 
carried out. 
 
Fee-for-service health care provision, privatisation as well as introduction of 
competition among insurers resulted in ineffective fragmented organisational 
structures and uncontrolled escalation in health care spending. It also created 
incentives for growing health inequalities between different social groups, between 
cities and rural areas, and for the division between health care and public health 
services as well as between different services of health care. For example, in the 
Czech Republic, privatisation of medical practice combined with the switch to the fee-
for-service health care provision accounted for the over-prescription of medical 
services and generally increased national spending on health care compared to the 
pre-transitional period (Potucek, 1994; Scheffler and Duitch, 2000). Cost escalation 
was rapid, from 6.5% of GDP in 1991 to 9.5% of GDP in 1995 (Goldstein et al, 
1996). Furthermore, 18 of 27 health insurance funds went bankrupt to the effect that 
now the state General Health Insurance Fund controls more than 80% of the 
“market”6. In Poland there were also no efficiency gains from introducing the quasi 
market in the health sector (Aksman, 2000) and, starting January 1, 2003, local health 
insurance funds will be centralised under the auspice of the National Health 
Protection Fund. In Hungary, created in 1993, the Self-Governments of Social 
Insurance proved to be a failure and were re-centralised in 1998 (Kahan and Gulácsi, 
2000). 
                                                 
6
 Data of the Institute of Health Policy and Economics, 2002. 
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The focus of the health sector reforms on funding and organisation coupled with a 
disregard to the delivery side seem to be a common pattern of health care reform in 
Eastern European countries. The delivery side of the health sector in general and the 
quality, quantity and proportions of different health services in particular, still need 
reform just as in the beginning of transition. Although in the course of transition the 
results of the early reforms were revised to the effect that the opposite strategies 
(nationalisation and re-centralisation) were opted for, reform of the reforms is still on 
the agenda.  At the same time, de-democratisation of health sector governance—
which resulted in the increased participation of various interest groups in health sector 
decision-making process, reallocation of decision-making functions and susceptibility 
of reforms to conflicting ideologies—dramatically reduced a problem-solving 
capacity of the health sector governance system. Therefore, feasibility and 
consistency of further reforms is in question. 
 
The above insights into health sector reform in selected Eastern European countries 
demonstrate the significance of technically complex economic and social policy 
issues regarding health sector funding and organisation7. Although there is a view 
that, ideally, health care funding and organisation should not be ideologically or any 
other way biased (Barr, 2001, Ch. 4), in this paper, I take the opposite view, viz. the 
actual results of health sector reform in Eastern Europe are outcomes of political 
rather than technical process. Thus, in order to explain these outcomes one needs to 
reconstruct causal mechanisms of political actions and interactions through which the 
reform took place as well as non-political factors that shaped the political actions and 
interactions. Explanation of past events is crucial for finding feasible and effective 
options for future reform. Such explanation can shed light on process of interest 
formation and institution building in the health policy arena. Therefore, one can 
identify institutional constraints resulting from past actions and incentives built into 
new institutions. Furthermore, given the argument of path dependence8, past events 
could have initiated causations that have effects on the present. 
                                                 
7
 It is important to be clear that my primary interest in selecting particular cases, i.e. Hungary, Poland 
and the Czech Republic, is not of nomothetic nature. Rather, I am interested in selected Eastern 
European countries tout court because they represent “crucial cases” (Eckstein,1975, p.113).  
8
 It holds that individual preferences and consequent political changes are linked not only to 
institutions, but also to previous decisions and as time goes by, the probability of deviating from the 
current path decreases unless a ‘window of exceptional opportunity’ emerges (Wilsford, 1994). 
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2. Significance of the topic 
Before I launch into the main purpose of this paper—to discuss how to explain 
outcomes of health sector reform in Eastern Europe—I believe it is necessary to 
clarify reasons why I chose this topic. The reasons are as follows. First, research into 
this topic has real-world policy implications; second, it attempts to make a 
contribution to the existent body of literature (King et al., pp.14-19).  
 
With regard to the latter, viz. contribution to the existent body of literature, such a 
contribution can be done in three ways. One, the topic under consideration potentially 
addresses one of the agendas in recent literature on the comparative politics of the 
welfare state, i.e. sustaining and reinvigorating the tradition of treating development 
of welfare states as long-term, macro-historical process (Pierson, 2000b, p. 792). It 
aspires to fill a very important regional, i.e. Eastern European, void. In spite of the 
facts that developments of Western welfare states were influenced and stimulated by 
the relevant developments in the former Eastern Block and that recent welfare state 
reforms in this group of countries were inspired by the West, there has been done little 
comparative research on the region of Eastern Europe. My aspiration is to go beyond 
conventional area studies by comparing a number of cases and using an explicit 
theoretical perspective.  
 
Two, there is a substantial imbalance in the literature on comparative politics of the 
welfare state in favour of the study of social security, pensions and overall welfare 
spending. The health sector is “often semi-detached from the wider literature on the 
welfare state” (Moran, 1999, p.1). Therefore, the study of the health sector aspires to 
redress the imbalance in the study of the welfare state. Variations in the health sector 
arrangements in different countries significantly structure social, political and 
economic life as well as contribute to substantial cross-national differences in life 
expectancy and quality of life. Because of this and also because of the fact that the 
health sector comprises a major part of social spending, many political and economic 
interests are vested in the sector of health care. Moreover, because of the strong 
requirements to enter the medical profession and divisions in the medical profession 
itself (e.g. Lewis, 1996), the health sector is characterised by the existence of a strong 
medical lobby and internal interest groups (e.g. Marmor and Tomas, 1972). As such, 
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the health care sector is rich material for political analysis which appeals for more 
research to be done.  
 
Finally, research into the politics of health care reform in Eastern Europe aspires to go 
beyond the traditional scope of analysis in the comparative politics of the welfare 
state. Traditionally, political scientists focused on the effects of institutions and paid 
less attention to the origins and change of institutions (Pierson, 2000a). The topic of 
the politics of health sector reform in Eastern Europe provides a rich soil to combine 
examination of the origins and change of institutions of health sector governance with 
examination of their effects on health policy.  
 
With regard to the second reason, viz. having real-world policy implications, research 
into the politics of health sector reform in Eastern Europe has a potential to address 
the real-world significance of this topic by “giving voice” (Ragin, 1994, p. 83) to this 
topic in Eastern Europe as well as in the wider international community. It attempts to 
draw policy relevant normative implications that could be used to increase 
understanding of this topic in public debate as well as to increase problem-solving 
capacity of the health sector governance system. Having discovered mechanisms 
through which the reform took place, one can see limits and inefficiencies of 
particular institutions in dealing with certain health policy problems. Being aware of 
these mechanisms, one can discover feasible institutional changes that can improve 
the capacity of the health sector governance system to produce effective solutions. On 
the other hand, it is difficult and costly to change institutions. As such, in the first 
instance, a primary concern should be with finding unexploited effective policy 
options within the limits of existing institutions.  
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3. Explanatory Paradigm 
3.1 Methodological Individualism 
There are two modes of explanation of social phenomena: methodological 
individualism9 and holism or determinism (social or historic). Broadly, in the history 
of social science, they correspond with “the more historical and interpretative 
Weberian tradition and the more strictly nomothetic Durkheimian tradition” (Mayntz, 
1992, p. 29). The latter attempts to construct a grand theory explaining society as a 
whole and as a macro-system with many interdependent elements and their specific 
functions. In such explanations, actors are disembodied and represented by units such 
as classes or nations rather than individuals with flesh and bones. Although this 
holistic mode of explanation may be useful for construction of interesting theoretical 
conceptualisations of long-run societal developments, it has a little relevance to 
empirical policy research and to the explanation of particular policy outcomes in a 
relatively short time. On the contrary, the methodological individualism mode of 
explanation has a great deal of relevance to policy research. 
 
The central tenant of methodological individualism is a bare fact that all social 
interactions are interactions among individuals. Methodological individualism asserts 
that a purported explanation only counts as an explanation if it is wholly couched in 
terms of facts about individuals (Lukes, 1968, p.122). Thus, methodological 
individualism prescribes to explain social phenomena in terms of individuals not other 
categories. As such, policy outcomes should be explained in terms of choices of 
individuals. However, in empirical interaction-oriented policy research, a unit of 
analysis is a set of interactions among policy actors usually represented by 
governments, ministries, trade unions, professional associations, political parties, etc.  
Such composite representation of individuals does not contradict with the above 
prescription of methodological individualism. The reason is that individuals also act 
in a representative capacity and they have the ability to act from a perspective of 
                                                 
9
 Here, the distinction should be kept between methodological individualism as methodology and 
individualism as ideology even though they are interconnected. To quote Friedrich von Hayek, “true 
individualism…is primary a theory of society, an attempt to understand the forces which determine the 
social life of a man, and only in the second instance a set of political maxims derived from this view of 
society” (Hayek, 1948, quoted in Arrow, 1994, p. 1). It is plausible to assume that the fact that health 
sector reform in Eastern Europe was driven by political forces with individualistic values makes a 
stronger case for applying methodological individualism to the study of this reform. 
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larger units (Scharpf, 1997, p.61).  At the same time, when it is necessary, analysis 
still should be focused on the level of individuals. 
 
3.2. Game Theory 
Apparently, methodological individualism does not attempt to formulate a macro-
theory but still allows making limited generalisations that are essential for drawing 
policy lessons.  These limited generalisations come in the form of mechanisms of 
human action and interaction. The way to describe these mechanisms is game theory.  
This is not a specific theory of social interaction but rather a “language” for such a 
theory (Arrow, 1994, p. 4). In short, in a game, each player chooses independently 
one strategy from a finite set of strategies available to him or her. An outcome or 
payoff of the game for each player is a function of the strategies of other players. 
Therefore, outcome or payoff functions of all players include interactions among all 
the players. An equilibrium outcome is an outcome in which players cannot increase 
their payoffs by unilaterally changing their strategies. Obviously, the optimising 
strategy for each player depends on choices of other players, but, naturally, human 
knowledge is limited. Moreover, although it is assumed that each player makes his or 
her choice individually and rationality, their rationality in reality is bounded and in 
making their choices they are influenced by social factors (Arrow, 1994, Scharpf, 
1997). In other words, the game is influenced by social factors and rules of the game 
are socially constructed. Hence, in order to benefit from game-theoretic perspective, 
we need to take into account the bounded rationality of a human action and social 
factors that affect human behaviour. In the next section, I will outline political science 
approaches that can help us to do so, but first I digress to discuss how strict the 
assumption of rational choice should be. 
 
3.3. Rational Choice Theory 
Basic assumptions of rational choice theory—i.e. actors are always a) means-end 
instrumental, b) far-sighted and that c) effects of actions are intended—are 
functionalistic. In the functionalist analysis, explanation of institutional origins and 
change associated with health sector reform to be found in their functional 
consequences for those who created them. There are currently two that complement 
each other’s lines of arguments accounting for the insufficiency of such analysis. 
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According to the first line of arguments advanced by Pierson (2000a), basic 
assumptions of rational choice theory, are too strict. It is argued that, in reality, 
institutional designers may not be instrumental, have short-term horizons and 
institutional effects may not be anticipated. It is therefore proposed that:  
(1) Functionalist premises about institutional origins and change should be replaced 
by functionalist hypotheses; and (2) functionalist hypotheses should be supplemented 
and contrasted with hypotheses stressing the possible nonfunctionalist roots of 
institutions (ibid., p. 493).   
As the argument goes on, such contrast of antagonistic hypotheses or “theoretical 
imageries” (Jepperson, 1996; cited in Pierson, 2000a, p.495) is to “recognize that 
distinct bodies of theories may provide greater leverage for analyzing particular 
context and dynamics” and that  
They may cover different aspects of process, with different theories contributing 
“modules” that can potentially be linked to produce more complete accounts 
(Scharpf, 1997) (Pierson, 2000a, p.495).  
According to the second line of arguments advanced by Miller (2000), although 
functionalist premises about institutional origins and change are not defensible, 
emphasis should be put on “cooperation” rather than competition between rational 
choice and other forms of explanation. Miller’s concern is that for rational choice 
such competition may result in the loss of policy arenas where it fails to provide ideal 
explanation. For Miller, the goal of the application of rational choice analysis to such 
arenas is explanation of inefficient or “dysfunctional” institutions through 
inefficiencies of the world of politics. For example, in the case of the Clinton health  
reform, the American political system did not allow to rational policy actors 
representing powerful interest groups to generate enough trust to co-operate with each 
other in order to design a more effective health system (ibid.). As in a prisoner’s 
dilemma game, no one was particularly happy with existing arrangements but 
everyone decided to pursue his or her optimising strategy with the effect that the 
outcome of the game was inferior to some other outcome. 
 
Albeit I do not share Miller’s concern, I find his suggestion worthwhile to use rational 
choice premises in order to, inter alia, explain inefficiency of institutions through 
inefficiencies of politics. I recognise that it is one of the ways of looking at the 
problem of the institutional bias that may gain important normative implications. I am 
therefore very sympathetic to the idea of proceeding with a research agenda premised 
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on rational choice in order not to necessarily have the best explanatory model in the 
first instance but to have an insight into how inefficiency of politics accounts for the 
inefficiency of the health sector. Most important, I agree with Pierson’s account on 
that distinct bodies of theory should be used to overcome the limits of rational choice 
theory.  
 
3.4. New Institutionalism 
When I started thinking why health sector reform in Eastern European countries did 
not bring substantial improvements to the health sector but rather overburdened the 
ailing economies of these countries with extra spending on health, I was puzzled by 
‘bounded innovation’ (Weir, 1992) in health policy; political institutions channelled 
the flow of ideas regarding health care reform with the result that some ideas became 
increasingly likely and others increasingly unlikely to influence actual policy making. 
Recognising the role of ideas and expertise as a special resource in policy-making 
(King, 1999), I was amazed to see that national Governments were tempted to use 
them selectively and to enjoy the symbolic side of expertise (e.g. Meyer and Rowan, 
1977). For example, in the beginning of the 1990s the Polish Government was willing 
to listen to advice in favour of radical liberal health polices but it kept its ears closed 
to more Fabian, in a sense “gradual”, policies. The latter lead to a dispute with the 
World Bank which, unlike in the case of the Czech Republic, strongly recommended 
that Poland postpone liberal health sector reform (Millard, 1994).  
 
It was also equally puzzling to see how the democratic policy process influenced 
explicit articulation of interests vested in the health care sector and allowed various 
interest groups to exercise pressure on particular policy proposals. The most 
significant example is the interests of the medical profession. Many of these interests 
were articulated along the lines of pre-existing divisions in medicine, e.g. divisions 
between doctors and administrators, doctors and auxiliary staff, curative and 
preventive medicine, health care and medical industries, central and local health care 
organisations, age and gender groups within the medical profession. The medical 
profession in Eastern Europe might even be stronger than in the West because it has 
both the parliamentary as well as the ministry of health “veto points” (Immergut, 
1992, p. 227). Unlike in the West, in Eastern European countries the health minister is 
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often a doctor, as are many parliamentarians, and the ministry of health who could 
easily be the ministry of the medical profession (Barr, 1996, p. 27). The interests of 
medical profession in Eastern Europe are also unlike ones in the West. While early 
reformist Governments in Eastern Europe tried to introduce free markets in health 
care, the medical profession mainly was struggling to preserve centrally run and 
publicly funded health care for the sake of keeping all doctors employed and 
adequately paid. Later, however, new divisions in the medical profession emerged 
along the lines of profitability of particular medical specialities and along the lines of 
new approaches to administration and funding. 
 
As evident from the above, political institutions can channel policy debates and enable 
interest groups to exercise pressure. In doing so, political institutions provide a 
general frame within which actual policy making is happening. Political institutions 
however neither create an agenda nor solely determine the result of political 
bargaining between various interest groups and other political actors. The latter bring 
their agendas and compete for their implementation in different policy arenas. 
Naturally, different governments have different commitments to health care reform; 
they can prioritise differently the urgency and strategies of health care reform. For 
example, in 1996, in the dispute over the urgency of health care reform, Hungary’s 
reformist minister of finance resigned (Nelson, 1999, p. 6). Furthermore, even if a 
consensus regarding certain health policies has been reached between different 
political actors, such policies can still be hard to implement due to the lack and limits 
of organisational and bureaucratic capacities. In order to explain the origins and 
change of institutions within a given health care system, it is not enough to just assess 
the effects of political institutions on the process of health care reform.  Closer 
attention should be paid to actors as well as organisational and bureaucratic capacities. 
 
Whereas, it is not in question that the institutional approach can provide us with 
valuable insights into the politics of health sector reform in Eastern Europe, here, I 
would like to give a brief outlook of alternatives in the history of political science for 
the institutional approach and, later, its variations in contemporary political science. 
The idea of institutions is not new in political science, e.g. Plato and Aristotle in their 
writings dealt with institutions. They predominantly focused on values, such as 
freedom and justice, imbedded in institutions. Later, political philosophers, e.g. Marx, 
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kept their attention on values as well as found an interest in looking at the social 
determinants of institutions. The core of the political philosophy enterprise was to 
apprise and evaluate political institutions and acts employing certain values. The 
behaviour movement, which emerged in the 1920s and gained particular strength in 
the 1950-60s, switched the attention of political scientists from ideal values to 
preferences of real individuals. Being concerned with real individuals and fascinated 
with the achievements of natural science, students of the political behaviour 
“scientified” political science by introducing the natural science research programme, 
empirical methods (as opposed to deductive thinking of political philosophers), 
quantification, and the interdisciplinary focus. Students of the political behaviour also 
abandoned political appraisal and evaluation by introducing the issue of value-
neutralism or scientific objectivity and starting describing values as empirical data or 
variables (Dahl, 1961, p. 771). The assumptions of behavioralism were that 
preferences are revealed through behaviour and that aggregation of interests through 
efficient summation leads to an equilibrium outcome. 
 
Table 3.4.1: Behavioralism and New Institutionalisms 
 
 Institutions Preferences Aggregation 
Behavioralism Arenas Revealed through 
political behaviour 
Efficient 
summation 
Rational Choice 
Institutionalism 
 
Decision rules Strategic choice Choice imposed 
by institutions 
Sociological 
Institutionalism/ 
Organisational 
Theory 
Information 
processing 
routines, symbol 
and classification 
systems, moral 
templates 
Bounded rationality, 
Interpretative frames 
 
Standard 
operating 
procedures 
Historical 
Institutionalism 
Rules, norms, 
procedures, 
legacies  
Alternative rationalities, 
Social construction of 
interests 
Contextual logic 
of causality 
Based on: Immergut, Ellen M. (1998) The Theoretical Core of New Institutionalism, Politics and 
Society, Vol. 26 No. 1, pp. 5-34 and Hall, P.A. and Taylor, C.R. (1996) Political Science and the Three 
New Institutionalisms, MPIFG Discussion Paper 96/6, MPIFG, Koeln. 
 
 
New institutionalism, which emerged in the 1970s, questioned the above assumptions 
of behavioralism. The counter-assumptions were that institutions somehow channel 
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choices and that interests cannot be simply aggregated and equilibrium therefore is 
problematic (Immergut, 1998). Table 3.4.1 summarises prepositions on the concept of 
institutions and ways of preferences’ formation and aggregation of choices which are 
developed by behavioralism and three branches of the new institutionalism.  
 
Theoretical perspectives from different political science approaches can elevate our 
understanding of politics. Rational choice theory provides the most consistent account 
of human rationality and the role of strategic interaction between various actors in 
determining policy outcomes. Rational choice theory is especially appealing in 
supplying a well-developed set of concepts, particularly in game theory, that are very 
helpful in generalising and theory-building. However, basic assumptions of rational 
choice theory are very strict and can hardly match any reality; they hold that actors are 
always means-end instrumental, far-sighted and that institutional effects are intended. 
As such, according to the rational choice, policy outcomes are always the most 
efficient solutions to particular problems at the moment when they appear. Students of 
sociological institutionalism go beyond considerations of efficiency. They almost 
break down the conceptual divide between “institutions and “culture” (Hall and 
Taylor, 1996, p. 14)10. Sociological institutionalists emphasise that institutional 
arrangements can be adopted not because they are efficient but because they are 
“appropriate” (Pierson, 2000a, p. 478) or because of “the role that collective processes 
of interpretation and concerns for social legitimacy play in the process” (Hall and 
Taylor, 1996, p. 20). As such, these arrangements may easily be inefficient for a 
particular local context. However, this sociological approach, from the political 
science point of view, has a fallacy of being “bloodless” as it can miss “a clash of 
power among actors with different competing interests” when an organisation or the 
Government adopts new institutional practices (ibid., p. 21). Historical 
institutionalism also has this kind of fallacy because it, like sociological 
institutionalism, which favours existing “appropriate” institutions, looks at the 
existing template of institutions to borrow the design of historically feasible ones. 
Collingwood, in “The Idea of History” (1961), considers history as the study of 
human thought and argues that history provides one with ‘human self-knowledge’; 
this essentially means knowing what can be done on the basis of what has been done 
                                                 
10
 In doing so, they even create a possibility to accommodate culture theory to political change (e.g. 
Eckstein, 1988). 
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(ibid, p. 10). History, therefore, as a “template” for institutional reform, can explain 
institutional change. Immergut proposes to make a distinction between this 
“methodological” usage of history in institutional research, i.e. history as a context for 
institutional change, and history as a “theory” or “anti-theory” (1998, p. 19-20). The 
latter stresses historical irregularities and objects plausibility of general causal model. 
The former, on the contrary, maintains that particular policy outcomes are explainable 
in terms of general causal models and critical historical junctures. For example, 
Immergut (1992) demonstrates that the issues of nationhood related to the return of 
Alsace and Lorraine were critical for the enactment of the first French national health 
insurance law. 
 
 
4. Analytical Framework 
4.1. Framework versus Theory  
 
The value of employing an analytic framework for policy research is two-fold. First, 
an analytical framework helps to draw “limited generalisations” from small-n case 
studies (Ragin, 1987) which can be used for practical policy-oriented purposes. 
Second, it allows using previous research to reduce complexity of a phenomenon 
under investigation (Scharpf, 1997). With regard to the first value, if we study a case 
descriptively and separately from other cases, we cannot draw any policy lessons from 
it. Only when we go beyond a description of a given case and compare it with other 
cases we can generate systematic knowledge applicable to other cases. In other words, 
only case studies that employ analytic frameworks can be comparable and cumulative 
(Marmor, 2000, p.63).     
 
With regard to the second value, an analytic framework substitutes theory in its role of 
guiding research. One needs to recognise that, currently, neither a general macro-
theory, nor a specific theory of policy change in Eastern Europe exists. Therefore, we 
cannot deduce hypotheses for explanation of health sector reform in Eastern Europe 
from such theories but rather we need to formulate our own hypotheses. Esping-
Andersen argues that although in the today’s dramatically changing world of “post-
something” there is no “real” theory;  there are challenges to reduce variance of the 
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phenomenon under study as well as to preserve disciplinary coherence (2000, p.59-
63). He therefore puts forward an argument for suggestive Leitmotifs viz.  
“…anchors, some stable, universally recognised, ‘social constraints’ against 
which we can gauge the importance of the mass of variation before our 
sociological eyes”; they are perceived as concepts akin to ‘democratic class 
struggle’ or ‘welfare capitalism’, which ‘are almost slogans, but condense 
meaning, summarising the spirit of the epoch”. As the argument goes on, the 
utility of a Leitmotif is that it “suggests that beneath all … chaotic variation, there 
lurks some fundamental principle of organisation and coherence (ibid, p.62). 
The Esping-Andersen’s idea of suggestive Leitmotifs comes close to the Ragin’s 
notion of “sensitising concepts” which are to be drawn from state-of-the-art literature 
in order to get research started (1994, pp.87-89). These sensitising concepts are 
supposed to be significantly clarified or even abandoned in the course of research. 
They, however, allow limiting research by collecting and organising evidences 
according to these concepts and related categories. At the same time, if initial 
sensitising concepts are significantly altered, there is a possibility to come back to the 
data initially abandoned as irrelevant.  
 
In my analysis, the main flaw of the notions of Leitmotifs and sensitising concepts is 
that despite acceptance of the fact that there is no “real” theory, their proponents are 
still looking for a complete explanation of a phenomenon under study that is based on 
one Leitmotif or one sensitising concept. I think that a more appropriate way to cope 
with the apparent absence of theory was suggested by Scharpf, namely that complete 
explanation can only be modular, i.e. consisting of several theoretical modules which 
can be linked by a partial theory or narrative (1997, pp. 29-35). Furthermore, these 
theoretical modules should not have a nature of “general-law-like regularities” about 
human behaviour but rather they should specify “small and medium-sized causal 
mechanisms of human action and interaction”, i.e. casual mechanisms (ibid.). 
Broadly, an example of such a modular explanation can be found in Marmor’s book 
“The Politics of Medicare” (2000). Throughout the book, Marmor uses three non-
mutually exclusive “models” to explain outcomes of Medicare reform in America, 
viz. “the rational actor model”, “the organisational process model” and “the 
bureaucratic politics model”. 
 
Having accepted the fact that explanations of policy outcomes can only be modular, 
one can borrow such modules from previous studies. Then, one can test whether they 
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have any explanatory power in our own study. An analytical framework therefore 
should lead one to domains where such modules can be found. It is argued that a rule 
of the thumb for identifying them is that they have a nature of specifying “small and 
medium-sized causal mechanisms of human action and interaction (Scharpf, 1997, p. 
30). It is also argued that these mechanisms should be attuned to specific policy actor 
constellations, modes of interaction among actors and institutional settings. Indeed, 
this argument bears a great deal of prima facie plausibility. For example, in the study 
of health care reform in Southern Europe, Guillén argues that, inter alia, 
democratisation, accounted for the introduction of national health services in Southern 
Europe (Guillén, 1999). Apparently, radical democratisation in Eastern Europe 
contributed towards the opposite outcome. 
 
4.2. Actor-Centered Institutionalism 
Although many studies have been done on the politics of health sector reform, there 
are no studies that would fully use the arguments developed in the previous sections 
of the paper, viz. 
- relevance of methodological individualism and game theory to policy analysis; 
- usefulness of rational choice theory for explanation of a rational side of human 
decision-making; 
- necessity to build in institutions to explain social and historical factors 
affecting human decision-making. 
The framework of actor-centered institutionalism (ACI) developed by Renate Mayntz 
and Fritz Scharpf (Scharpf, 1997) is based on the above considerations and therefore 
provides a promising line of enquiry into the politics of health sector reform in 
Eastern Europe. Below, I will sketch out central tenants of this framework: game-
theoretic modelling, actor constellation, mode of interaction and institutional setting. 
 
This framework is applicable within the domain of interaction-oriented policy 
research (Figure 4.2.1). In order to explain a particular policy outcome, ACI 
prescribes to model interaction among policy actors as a game. A game is 
characterised by a particular actor constellation. The latter comprises the players 
involved in a given game, their strategies, outcomes associated with strategy 
combinations and preferences of players over these outcomes. 
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Figure 4.2.1. The domain of interaction-oriented policy research 
Based on: Scharpf, F. W. (1997) Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy 
Research, Westview, Boulder, CO, p.44. 
 
Game constellations therefore bear information about a potential conflict and whether 
it can be resolved, i.e. whether players can maximise their payoffs, through 
coordinating their strategies or competing with each other. A game is also 
characterised by certain modes of interaction through which the conflict between the 
actors could be resolved, such as unilateral action, negotiated agreement, majority 
vote, hierarchical direction. In real-world situations, a policy outcome can depend not 
only on one game but also on several “nested” games. For example, the explanation of 
particular health policies will not solely depend on a “Government-World Bank” 
cooperative game. Since the Government is not a unitary actor we need to 
complement this module with at least a nested competitive game “Ministry of 
Finance-Ministry of Health”. Altogether, actor constellations and modes of interaction 
allow us to discuss the capacity of given systems of policy interactions to deal with 
certain policy problems. The institutional setting within which interaction is taking 
place also influences the problem-solving capacity of the system. In ACI, institutions 
are usually understood as rules that structure the courses of actions that actors may 
choose. Although it is common to ascribe to institutions a meaning of organisations, 
organisations are represented by actors in the context of ACI. As such, institutions are 
defined as legal rules, social norms, organisational practices, etc. (Table 3.4.1.). 
 
Institutional Setting 
Actors 
 
Constel-
lations 
 
Modes 
of  Inte-
raction 
Prob-
lems 
Poli-
cies 
 
Policy Environment 
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5. Conclusion 
The main task of this paper has been to introduce the topic of the politics of health 
sector reform in Eastern Europe and to single out some promising lines of inquiry into 
this topic. The paper proposed that in order to explain outcomes of the reform, one 
needs to reconstruct causal mechanisms of political actions and interactions through 
which the reform took place as well as non-political factors that shaped the political 
actions and interactions. In other words, it has been proposed that explanation should 
be sought in the domain of interaction-oriented policy research. As such, it has been 
suggested to employ in further research the framework of actor-centered 
institutionalism.  
 
The chief concern of the paper was that democratic and liberal reforms in Eastern 
Europe brought about ineffective and inefficient policies for the health care sector. 
Furthermore, such reforms attempted to dismantle former institutions and to create 
new ones. Apparently, institutional changes take time and therefore future reforms 
face the problem of fragmented institutions that are still in flux. Furthermore, the 
reforms reallocated decision-making functions in the health policy arena with the 
effect that local authorities and various interest groups featuring among others the 
medical profession and pharmaceutical companies can influence the policy-making 
process. In such conditions of fragmented fluid institutions and multiple veto-points, 
future reformers need to either introduce institutional changes creating possibilities 
for effective governance or to discover unexploited options that rely on existing 
institutional capacities and are acceptable to actors controlling veto-points. It is our 
claim that these changes and options can be discovered by tracing interest formation 
in the health policy arena and by careful examination of specific policy relevant 
constellations of actors and their modes of interaction within given institutional 
settings. 
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